

MAY 7 1959

Approved For Release 1999/09/17
STATINTL

A New Strategy For Cold War?

Sen. Fulbright Says We Need One—and Soon

The Cuban and Laotian crises, as well as longer-range problems of foreign policy, were discussed last Sunday on NBC-TV's "Meet the Press" by Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Questioning him were permanent panelist Lawrence E. Spivak, John Hightower of the Associated Press, Frank Bourgholtzer of NBC News and Peter Lisagor of the Chicago Daily News. Excerpts from the discussion follow:

SPIVAK: Sen. Fulbright, you recently said in a speech, "The U. S. is clearly undergoing the gravest test in its history." And you also said, "I believe that the people of America will rise to the needs of our situation if they are clearly told what is at stake."

Will you tell us clearly and as specifically as you can what you believe to be at stake in this battle against the Communists?

FULBRIGHT: I think that we have not realized the seriousness of the drive of the Communists in the non-military activities throughout the world. I think we have been preoccupied with the military aspect of this struggle.

A Non-Military Solution

Now in Laos the military aspect of the Communists is there. In Cuba it is not; that is, not directly. It is through infiltration and subversion. And the solution to this, if there is one, is not military, in my opinion. And I think we have neglected this aspect of the struggle with communism.

SPIVAK: Well, when you say we have neglected, when you and others say we must make sacrifices—who must make sacrifices and what kind of sacrifices? What can the people do?

FULBRIGHT: Well, I think this country has not devoted nearly enough attention and effort and money to the non-military contest with communism. All over the world we have had much too small an operation, especially in the exchange program, the cultural, the assistance of social reforms in many parts of the world.

Take in Latin America, for example. We have had close association with them certainly since 1898. During this period we have intervened on many occasions there. We have rarely done anything of any significance in the social reform of these countries.

SPIVAK: But the criticism that has been made of the American people themselves is their unwillingness to make sacrifices.

FULBRIGHT: I do not think they are unwilling. I do not think they have been properly led in this respect. They have not been told in a clear enough manner just what we ought to do. I think they would make the sacrifices if they are made aware of the seriousness of it, and then are told what to do and how.

The Missing Follow-Through

For example, to pay more taxes, and to create and support programs that are much better designed to meet his problem than we now have. I think this refusal to enter into long-term programs in any of our foreign aid programs is an indication of this. There has been a feeling that we will get rid of it next year; let's keep it on an annual basis.

SPIVAK: How are we going to pay more taxes if someone does not ask us?

FULBRIGHT: I agree with you. I say people have to be told of the need or asked to do so.

SPIVAK: You are saying your Administration has not told us all that ought to be told, not called upon us for the sacrifices we ought to make?

FULBRIGHT: I would say that is about correct. I thought this Administration, when it started, in the speech of the President when he said that we should not ask what the country can do for you but what you can do for the country, set the proper tone. I, in all frankness, do not believe we have followed through on that as we should.

HIGHTOWER: Senator, much that you say here now is cast in a fairly long-range perspective. There is, of course, in the case of Laos, an immediate, short-range problem. The most direct question I can think to ask on that problem is this: Do you think that in

order to prevent the Communists from taking over Laos, if it becomes necessary to achieve that end, would it be wise for the U. S. to send its own forces?

FULBRIGHT: I do not think so.

HIGHTOWER: What do you think would be the result in such a situation if the U. S. did not send forces in and if Laos were lost?

FULBRIGHT: Well, it would be a very serious loss. This is, I think, a very serious matter, but I do not think the terrain and the conditions are proper for our sending in our troops. Some other solution must be sought.

BOURGHOLTZER: How much consultation on the



SEN. FULBRIGHT

"Reform, rather than relief."

Cuban affair was there prior to the fact, or did this all burst as a great surprise to Congress?

FULBRIGHT: Well, no. I think there was a reasonable amount of consultation.

BOURGHOLTZER: Do you think the result of this has been a serious and damaging loss of prestige to the U. S.

FULBRIGHT: I certainly do.

BOURGHOLTZER: Is there any way to recoup?

FULBRIGHT: Well, I think the initiative taken last summer at Bogota and followed up recently at the meeting in Rio in developing this so-called alliance for progress, the program that is under way in analyzing the Inter-American Bank, is the way to meet this program.

I deeply regret that this other incident has intervened, because this was a most hopeful development. It is the first time we have sufficiently, in a reasonably substantial manner, undertaken to be of real assistance to these countries in reforming their own society—that is, giving them assistance in the kind of social reform that I mentioned. I mean by that, improving the living conditions through housing programs, through land reform, through the breaking down of the ancient feudal systems that have prevailed there ever since they were colonies of Spain. And I think we can help them.

We never have devoted any real efforts in this direction. This, I think, is the main hurdle—so this is on the way.

SPIVAK: Senator, on the question of foreign aid,

we have spent, I believe, World War II on economic seem to be on the defensive all over the world. Do you think policy on the way we give foreign do about it is in order?

FULBRIGHT: I do. As you know, many of us have been very critical of the has been conducted. I have already mentioned the one of the major things is the refusal of Congress to accept a long-term program.

Now, my committee tried to do this, as you recall, two years ago. We brought out a bill providing for a five-year program to give the opportunity to plan in advance and to analyze each country and to make an effective program. We were turned down. The Administration withdrew its support at that time after the bill was on the floor.

But I think this is a major difference. It is the acceptance of the responsibility for real, I would say, reform or progress in this field, rather than relief.

Long-Term Success

I would say about the large amount you mentioned that about two-thirds of that at least has been of a military nature. And I think we have overemphasized the military relative to the non-military activities except in the case of the Marshall Plan in Western Europe, which was an outstanding success, and it is the only one which was approached as a long-term program.

SPIVAK: Are you planning again this year when foreign aid comes up to put it on a long-term basis?

FULBRIGHT: Well, we have already discussed this informally with the Administration, and I hope they are planning to bring it up that way. It is my current understanding that they are favorable to this approach.

This is a very difficult program. They are taking their time. It is going to be another month, I expect, nearly a month, before they get the program up, and the reason is that they are trying to work this thing over and to put it on a more sensible basis.

HIGHTOWER: The President has said on several occasions recently that the U. S. has to prepare itself with different tactics and different strategy to fight the cold war in a different manner. I am curious about some of the problems that arise in that respect. A year ago we had the U2 incident, and the President took personal responsibility for it. Recently in the Cuban matter, President Kennedy took personal responsibility. Now is such an acceptance of public personal responsibility in your view an essential part of the Presidential office?

FULBRIGHT: I think that the President should not take responsibility for espionage activities—the covert activities of the government. This is contrary to the practice of all civilized states since the beginning. I think there is a distinction in this respect between the Cuban affair and the U2 affair.

I think in [the Cuban] case it was so well publicized in the press, so that it is not the same. But, generally speaking, for all overt activities the President necessarily takes responsibility.

'A Gray Operation'

HIGHTOWER: What I want to get at beyond this is the question whether there is a mechanism or a way of organizing the government which ought to be looked into so that the President's responsibility clearly terminates for detail at some point.

FULBRIGHT: Well, I think that is right. I do not think the way we have organized and conduct the CIA is a very efficient and proper method. There have been many criticisms of this, you know, going back to the Clark report of 10 and 12 years ago. And I think it itself has become a kind of semi-public activity. Its leader makes speeches, and everybody knows certain things about CIA, so that it is a gray operation rather than a covert one. And I think this surely will be the subject of comment by Gen. Taylor in his report. They are now investigating the CIA, and I think this ought to be handled by that.

LISAGOR: I assume you accept the President's word that the situation confronting us in the world is pretty grim and that the hour is late. Would you think it prudent then, if it is that bad, for him to declare a national emergency of some kind in which we could get our priorities straightened out and do what is necessary to stay in business?

FULBRIGHT: Well, I do not know about the formal declaration of an emergency. I would hope that the President will give special attention to informing us over television, and having what I would call some educational interviews rather than spot news interviews, to inform all of us of the nature of the conditions that we confront and what we ought to do about it.

I think this has the highest priority. I think the American people are eager and anxious to do whatever needs to be done if it is clearly outlined.

I think my principal criticism of the new Administration is the failure to go through with this thought of outlining more clearly what our situation is, where we are, and then what we ought to do and where we ought to go.